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ABSTRACT
Integrated circuit (IC) camouflaging is a promising tech-
nique to protect the design of a chip from reverse engi-
neering. However, recent work has shown that even cam-
ouflaged ICs can be reverse engineered from the observed
input/output behaviour of a chip using SAT solvers. How-
ever, these so-called SAT attacks have so far targeted only
camouflaged combinational circuits. For camouflaged se-
quential circuits, the SAT attack requires that the internal
state of the circuit is controllable and observable via the
scan chain. It has been implicitly assumed that restrict-
ing scan chain access increases the security of camouflaged
ICs from reverse engineering attacks. In this paper, we de-
velop a new attack methodology to decamouflage sequen-
tial circuits without scan access. Our attack uses a model
checker (a more powerful reasoning tool than a SAT solver)
to find a discriminating set of input sequences, i.e., one that
is sufficient to determine the functionality of camouflaged
gates. We propose several refinements, including the use of
a bounded model checker, and sufficient conditions for de-
termining when a set of input sequences is discriminating
to improve the run-time and scalabilty of our attack. Our
attack is able to decamouflage a large sequential benchmark
circuit that implements a subset of the VIPER processor.
1. INTRODUCTION
Vendors that provide commercial IC reverse engineering
services are an increasing threat to the confidentiality of
IC designs. Using chemical etching and high-resolution mi-
croscopy, vendors of reverse engineering services have re-
constructed gate-level netlists of complex nanometer scale
ICs [1], thus compromising the IC designer’s intellectual
property (IP). IP theft of this nature can negatively impact
an IC designer’s revenue and competitive advantage.
IC camouflaging is a promising technique to protect the
designer’s IP against reverse engineering attacks. IC camou-
flaging works by augmenting a traditional CMOS technology
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
Copyright 200X ACM X-XXXXX-XX-X/XX/XX ...$10.00.
library with so-called camouflaged standard cells. A camou-
flaged standard cell can implement one of many Boolean
logic functions, even though its layout looks the same to a
reverse engineer regardless of its functionality. Several dif-
ferent techniques have been proposed in literature to imple-
ment camouflaged standard cells. These include the use of
dummy contacts [2] and threshold-voltage dependent cam-
ouflaging [3, 4, 5]. Given the economic and strategic value
of IC camouflaging, there has been considerable research on
determining which gates in an IC to camouflage so as to
maximize security [6, 7, 8].
Recently, El Massad et al. [9] demonstrated that all exist-
ing camouflaging schemes can be broken using the so-called
“SAT attack.” (A similar technique to defeat logic encryp-
tion was concurrently proposed in [10].) The SAT attack as-
sumes that the attacker has access to two functioning copies
of the IC. One is reverse-engineered to reconstruct the IC’s
netlist barring, of course, the functionality of each camou-
flaged standard cell. The other copy is used to observe the
IC’s input/output (I/O) behavior.
The goal of the SAT attack is to find a set of inputs that
are sufficient to deduce the functionality of the camouflaged
standard cells. The attack iteratively determines new inputs
that prune the attacker’s search space. The attack termi-
nates when the camouflaged standard cells have only one
unique assignment (or multiple functionally equivalent as-
signments). New input patterns and the final completion
(a completion is an assignment of identities to camouflaged
gates) are determined using a SAT solver. El Massad et al.
demonstrated empirically that only a small number of inputs
are required to exactly decamouflage even large benchmark
netlists, and that attackers can do so in the order of minutes.
This work has resulted in renewed focus on stronger cam-
ouflaging schemes that are secure against SAT attacks [7,
8].
However, one criticism of the SAT attack and its sub-
sequent enhancements [11] is that these attacks have all fo-
cused on decamouflaging combinational netlists, i.e., netlists
without internal state. Real world ICs, on the other hand,
are typically sequential, i.e., they implement finite state ma-
chines (FSMs) with internal state stored in flip-flops. The
SAT attack implicitly assumes that the IC’s internal state
can be fully controlled and observed via scan chains, thus re-
ducing the problem to that of reverse engineering a combina-
tional netlist. A designer concerned about IP theft, however,
can easily block user-mode access to the scan chain using a
secure scan interface [12]. Thus, although the attacker still
ar
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Figure 1: ISCAS s27 sequential benchmark circuit with two camouflaged gates, G1 and G2. Also shown are the two states in
the FSMs corresponding to the correct decamouflaging solution and incorrect solutions, respectively.
Figure 2: ISCAS s27 sequential benchmark circuit with two
camouflaged gates, G1 and G2. Also shown are the two
states in the FSMs corresponding to the correct decamou-
flaging solution and incorrect solutions, respectively.
has access to the IC’s primary I/Os, they cannot control or
observe the state of internal flip-flops during IC operation.
As we illustrate below, the SAT attack does not work
for ICs with internal state that cannot be accessed
via scan chains. This is a major practical limitation of the
SAT attack.
Motivational Example Consider the netlist shown in Fig-
ure 1. The netlist corresponds to the s27 circuit from the IS-
CAS’89 sequential benchmark suite[13]. Two gates, NAND
gate U8 and a NOR gate U9 have each been implemented
using a camouflaged standard cell. We assume that the cam-
ouflaged standard cell can implement either a NAND or a
NOR gate. The primary output W of the circuit depends
on both the primary inputs (A, B, C, and D) and the state
of the flip-flops. We will assume, without any loss of gener-
ality, that all flip-flops are initially set using a global (re)set
signal.
As shown in Figure 1, an attacker with full scan access
can set the output of each flip-flop to any desired value,
and can thus treat flip-flop outputs as new primary inputs
(inputs E, F and G). Similarly, the attacker can scan out
the the input of each flip-flop, and can thus treat flip-flop
inputs as new primary outputs (outputs X, Y and Z). The
SAT attack, or in fact even the less powerful logic testing
based attack proposed by Rajendran et al. [6], can be used to
decamouflage the resulting combinational netlist. Figure 1
shows two inputs that are sufficient to decamouflage gates
U8 and U9; the first input reveals the identity of U8 while
the second reveals the identity of U9.
Now consider an attacker without scan access. The at-
tacker can no longer control flip-flop outputs or observe flip-
flip inputs. To apply the SAT attack, an attacker can treat
the sequential circuit as a single-stage combinational circuit
by repeatedly resetting the flip-flops, applying primary in-
puts A, B, C and D, and observing the primary output
W . Unfortunately, this strategy does not work. As shown
in Figure 2, primary output W equals 0 regardless of the
identity of camouflaged gates U8 and U9.
Yet, as shown in Figure 2, applying a sequence of two
inputs recovers the correct identities of the two camouflaged
gates. That is, the output of the FSM after the second input
is applied is 1 if and only if gate U8 is a NAND and gate U9
is a NOR. In general, we note that an attacker might require
not only one but multiple input sequences to reverse engineer
camouflaged sequential circuits without scan access. Finding
a set of input sequences that is sufficient to decamouflage the
netlist is the goal of our attack.
In general, removing scan access from a camouflaged se-
quential circuit makes the reverse engineering problem more
challenging for several reasons. For one, an attacker with
scan access can arbitrarily set the state of the sequential cir-
cuit to states that help discriminate the identities of camou-
flaged gates (as in the example above). On the other hand,
an attacker without scan access must apply a sequence of
inputs that lead the sequential circuit to the desired state.
However, the input sequence itself depends on the identi-
ties of camouflaged gates. Second, an attacker without scan
access only observes the primary outputs and must infer
the next state outputs computationally. Given these chal-
lenges, a natural question that arises is the following: does
restricting scan chain access for camouflaged sequential cir-
cuits enhance their security against reverse engineering at-
tacks? Our new attack seeks to answer this question both
foundationally and empirically.
Our Contributions In this paper, we make the following
novel contributions.
• We introduce the first attack methodology to decam-
ouflage sequential circuits without access to internal
state of the flip-flops. Our attack searches iteratively
for input sequences; each new input sequence elimi-
nates one or more remaining decamouflaging solutions
till only correct completions/solutions are remaining.
• We characterize the computational complexity of two
important sub-problems in our attack procedure: is a
given set of input sequences sufficient to decamouflage
the netlist (DISC-SET-SEQ-DEC), and finding a com-
pletion that is consistent with a set of input sequences
(COMPLETION-DEC). We show that the former prob-
lem is in PSPACE, while the latter is NP. Conse-
quently, our attack uses a model checker to find new
input sequences, to decide when to terminate and to
identify correct completions.
• We propose a practical attack methodology that uti-
lizes a bounded model checker and sufficient conditions
for the DISC-SET-SEQ-DEC problem to reduce the run-
time of the attack.
• Our experimental results speak to the strength of our
attack; we are able to decamouflage a sequential bench-
mark that represents a part of the VIPER processor
netlist with more than 5000 gates in a matter of hours.
For benchmarks which our attack fails to fully decam-
ouflage, we still correctly decamouflage up to 30 out of
32 camouflaged gates.
2. RELATEDWORK
Techniques for extracting the underlying netlist of inte-
grated circuits via chemical etching, delayering and scan-
ning electron microscopy (SEM) are offered by companies
like Chipworks [1] and Degate [14] as part of their commer-
cial reverse-engineering services. These companies also de-
velop and offer software tools to aid in the process of circuit
extraction. Torrence et al. [15] provide a detailed overview
of the IC reverse engineering process.
Camouflaging technology aims to protect against the mis-
use of these IC reverse-engineering techniques for piracy
and copyright infringement. Several proposals have been
made, both in academia and industry, for implementing
camouflaged cells for use in ASIC processes. These include
dummy-contact-based camouflaged cells [2, 16, 8] as well as
threshold-voltage dependent gates [5, 8].
Because camouflaged standard cells incur area, delay and
power overheads, recent research has focused on determining
which gates to camouflage to maximize security. However,
all of the work has considered camouflaging only combina-
tional circuits, or equivalently, assumed sequential circuits
in which the attacker has scan access. Rajendran et al. [6]
showed that randomly selecting gates to camouflage is vul-
nerable to VLSI testing based attacks, and proposed a new
selection scheme that tries to maximize the number of non-
resolvable gates. However, this scheme was broken by El
Massad [9] and Subramanyan et al.’s SAT attacks. In re-
sponse to these attacks, [7] and [8] concurrently developed
SAT-attack resilient schemes that try to ensure that dis-
criminating sets are exponentially sized. However, as ac-
knowledged by the authors, these schemes also come with
a fundamental trade-off: the output corruptability (or error
rate) of these schemes is low; that is, incorrect completions
agree with correct completions on almost all inputs.
In this paper, we seek to analyze the security of camou-
flaging schemes that purport to defend against SAT attacks
in a different way, i.e., by removing access to scan chains
(instead of reducing output corruptability/error rate as in
the schemes proposed by [7] and [8]). While our new attack
is successful on a range of benchmarks, we also find that
there are some benchmarks whose security is enhanced by
removing scan access.
3. ATTACK PROCEDURE
In this section, we describe our attack procedure. We
first precisely describe the attack objective and introduce
some notation that aids our exposition. Then, we define
two computational problems that form the foundation of our
procedure and characterize their computational complexity.
Finally, we describe how the procedure works, and the prac-
tical choices we made while designing the attack.
3.1 Problem Formulation
As noted before, we assume that the attacker obtains two
copies of the IC. The attacker use the first copy as a black
box and exercises it with inputs. Let C represent the black-
box IC. The attacker using chemical etching and imaging
to extract the netlist of the second IC — let C refer to the
extracted netlist. A subset of gates in C are camouflaged.
Let m be the number of primary inputs, n be the number
of primary outputs, k be the number of camouflaged gates
and l be the number of flip-flops (bits of internal state) in
C (and C). For instance, in Figure 1, m = 4, n = 1, k = 2
and l = 3. We assume, without loss of generality, that each
camouflaged gate in the IC implements one of t Boolean
functions. In the example in Figure 1, for instance, t =
2 because each camouflaged gate is either a NAND or a
NOR. A completion X : {1, 2, . . . , k} → {1, 2, . . . , t} assigns
a Boolean function to each camouflaged gate in C. Given a
completion X of C, we denote the completed circuit by CX .
Now consider a sequence of inputs I = (i0, i1, . . . , ip−1) of
length p applied to C starting from the initial reset state,
s0. Here, i0 is the input applied in the first time step, i1 is
the input applied in the second time step, and so on. Let
C(I) = (o0, o1, . . . , op) denote the sequence of outputs that C
produces for input sequence I.
Similarly, for a completionX of C, let CX(I) = (o0, o1, . . . , op)
denote the sequence of outputs produced by circuit CX for
sequence I, assuming as above that inputs are applied start-
ing from the initial reset state, s0
Let I denote the set of all input sequences of length 2l,
which we refer to as the universal set of input sequences.
Given C and C, the goal of our attack is to find a completion
X∗ such that
∀I ∈ I, CX∗(I) = C(I), (1)
that is, we seek an assignment X∗ of Boolean functionalities
to camouflaged gates such that the outputs of the completed
netlist, CX∗ agree with outputs of the black-box circuit C
on all input sequences of length 2l. Equivalently, we seek
an X∗ such that CX∗ is sequentially equivalent to C. We
call such a completion a correct completion. We note that a
correct completion is not necessarily unique. However, as we
find any correct completion, it means we have successfully
reverse-engineered (the Boolean functionality of) C.
3.2 Foundations of Our Attack
In this section, we define two decision problems that form
the foundation of our attack procedure. We start by intro-
ducing the notion of a discriminating set of input sequences,
which generalizes the notion of a discriminating set of inputs
that was introduced by El Massad et al. [9] in the context
of decamouflaging combinational circuits.
Definition 1. A set of input sequences I = {I0, I1, . . . , In}
is called discriminating if every completion X that satisfies
CX(Ij) = C(Ij), ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
is a correct completion.
We now articulate the problem of deciding whether a set
of input sequences is discriminating for a sequential circuit,
and identify the computational complexity class to which
the problem belongs.
Definition 2. We define DISC-SET-SEQ-DEC to be the
following decision problem. Given the following three in-
puts: (i) a camouflaged circuit C, (ii) I, a set of input se-
quences, and (iii) the set of outputs obtained from apply-
ing input sequences in I to the black-box circuit, each time
starting from state s0, i.e., C(I) = {C(I1), . . . , C(In)}, where
I = {I1, . . . , In}. Is I a discriminating set for C?
Theorem 1. DISC-SET-SEQ-DEC is in PSPACE.
The proof for the above theorem is in the appendix. We
remark on the significance of this result below.
Remark. The fact that DISC-SET-SEQ-DEC is inPSPACE
suggests that a viable strategy for tackling the problem is to
reduce it to model checking which is known to be complete
for PSPACE. This is exactly what we do in our attack
procedure, as we describe in Section 3.3.
Remark. The corresponding decision problem for camou-
flaged combinational circuits, i.e., whether a given set of in-
puts (note, not input sequences) is discriminating, was found
to be in the complexity class co-NP, which is contained in
PSPACE.
We next define a problem that captures the computational
task of finding a correct completion given a discriminating
set of input sequences for a camouflaged circuit.
Definition 3. We define COMPLETION-DEC to be the
following decision problem. Given the following three inputs:
(i) a camouflaged circuit C, (ii) I, a set of input sequences,
and (iii) the outputs obtained from applying inputs in I on
the black-box circuit, i.e., C(I). Does there exist a completion
X such that ∀I ∈ I, CX(i) = C(I)?
Theorem 2. COMPLETION-DEC is in NP.
Proof. A certificate for COMPLETION-DEC is a comple-
tion X such that CX agrees with the black-box circuit on
input sequences in I. X is polynomially sized in the input to
COMPLETION-DEC (X can be encoded using k log(t) bits).
Verifying that CX agrees with the black box on sequences in
I can be done in time O(|I||C|) which is polynomial in the
size of the input.
We note here that the relevance of COMPLETION-DEC is
that it yields a correct completion (as a certificate) when
the input to the problem is a discriminating set of input se-
quences. The theorem implies that one can reduce COMPLETION-
DEC to a problem that is complete for NP, in particu-
lar, to CNF-SAT, and then use an off-the-shelf SAT solver
for the resulting SAT instance. Our reduction from DISC-
SET-SEQ-DEC to the model checking problem however fa-
cilitates an alternative and more convenient approach for
COMPLETION-DEC, as we describe below in Section 3.3.
3.3 Practical Attack Procedure
Our attack proceeds iteratively: we maintain a set of in-
put sequences I that is initially empty. In each iteration,
we add one (or more) new input sequences to the set. We
stop when we determine that our set of input sequences is
discriminating.
However, a naive implementation of this procedure would
make a call to an unbounded model checker in each iteration,
that is, a model checker that searches for input sequences
of arbitrary length. Unfortunately, calls to an unbounded
model checker can be time consuming. Instead, we add new
input sequences of bounded length (using a bounded model
checker), and increase the bound only when needed. Fur-
ther, instead of directly calling an unbounded model checker
to decide if the current set of input sequences is discriminat-
ing (the termination condition for our procedure), we first
check two simpler sufficient conditions for termination. Our
refined attack procedure is described below.
3.3.1 Finding New Input Sequences
To find new input sequences to add to our set, we con-
struct a solver MBMC for DISC-SET-SEQ-DEC by reducing
DISC-SET-SEQ-DEC to a bounded model checking problem.
Given C, I, and C(I) as defined in Definition 2, and a pa-
rameter b that specifies the model checking bound, MBMC
returns true if and only if for any two completions X1 and
X2, and every input sequence I of length at most b, the
following implication is true:
CX1(I) = CX2(I) = C(I) =⇒ CX1(I) = CX2(I).
Note that if MBMC returns true, it does necessarily mean
that the given set I is indeed a discriminating set of input
sequences for our camouflaged circuit. It means only that
the solver is unable to find a new input sequence of length
at most b that helps to eliminate any of the remaining com-
pletions.
If if MBMC returns false on the other hand, it returns,
two completions X1 and X2 and a new input sequence I˜ of
length at most b such that CX1(I) = CX2(I) = C(I) for all
I ∈ I, but CX1(I˜)) 6= CX2(I˜), i.e., CX1 and CX2 agree with
the black-box circuit on input sequences in I, but produce
different outputs for input sequence I˜.
We call MBMC at every iteration in our algorithm; pass-
ing it our camouflaged circuit, our current set of input se-
quences, and the output of the black-box circuit for each
sequence in the set. If MBMC returns with a sequence I˜, we
add I˜ to our set of input sequences.
3.3.2 Termination Criteria
As we stated previously, our MBMC solver cannot decide
whether a set of input sequences I is discriminating. For
this, we need to call an unbounded model checker. How-
ever, before calling the unbounded model checker, we check
for two conditions that are sufficient to show that I is dis-
criminating. The intuition behind performing these checks
before calling an unbounded model checker is that we expect
them to be computationally less time consuming.
1. Unique Completion (UC): We check to see if there
is only one remaining completion that agrees with the
black-box circuit on the current set of input sequences.
Specifically, we try to find two distinct completions
that agree with the black-box circuit on the current set
of input sequences, i.e. we try to find two completions
X1 and X2 such that
CX1(I) = CX2(I) = C(I) and X1 6= X2
Proposition 1. If no such X1 and X2 exist, then
I is a discriminating set for C.
Proof. Follows immediately from the definition of
a discriminating set of input sequences.
2. Combinational Equivalence (CE) Next, we check
whether all completions that agree with the black-
box circuit on the current set of input sequences are
combinationally equivalent with respect to both out-
put and next state function. That is, if we denote by
C˜X(i, s) = (o, s
′) the pair of output o and next state
s′ of completed circuit CX when in state s, and at the
application of input i, we ask whether
CX1(I) = CX2(I) = C(I) =⇒
C˜X1(i, s) = C˜X2(i, s) ∀i ∈ {0, 1}m, s ∈ {0, 1}l. (2)
Proposition 2. If Condition (2) holds for set I and
camouflaged circuit C, then I is a discriminating set
for C.
Proof. Since C˜X1(i, s) = C˜X2(i, s) for all possi-
ble inputs i and all possible states s, it follows that
CX1(I) = CX2(I) for every input sequence I. Thus, I
is discriminating for C.
We check Condition (2) by calling a solver CE that
we construct. We give it as input: (i) the camouflaged
circuit C, (ii) our current set of input sequences I,
and (iii) the outputs C(I) of the black-box circuit for
input sequences in I. If the solver returns true, we
terminate.
3. Unbounded Model Check (UMC) If the preceding
two checks fail, we finally call a solver MUMC that we
have constructed. The ‘U ’ is for “Unbounded.” We
give it as input: (i) our camouflaged circuit C, (ii) the
current set of input sequences I, and, (iii) the outputs
C(I) of the black-box circuit. The solver MUMC , unlike
MBMC , returns true if and only if I is a discriminating
set for C.
3.3.3 Finding a Correct Completion
Since the COMPLETION-DEC problem is in NP, it can
be reduced to a CNF-SAT instance and solved using a SAT
solver. However, we note that our model checking based
solver for DISC-SET-SEQ-DEC has the property that if I is
a discriminating set for C, then a correct completion is en-
coded in every initial state of the model. As such, we do
not need to call an external SAT solver to find a correct
completion. We simply ask our model checker to choose any
element from the set of initial states. We denote this pro-
cedure for the COMPLETION-DEC problem as solver N . N
takes as input the camouflaged circuit C, the current set of
input sequences I, the outputs C(I) of the black-box circuit,
and outputs a correct completion X∗ if I is discriminating.
3.3.4 Complete Algorithm
Our complete algorithm is expressed as Algorithm 1. In
the algorithm, we start with an initial bound b = 0 for our
BMC solver, i.e., MBMC . At every iteration, if we determine
that we need to continue, i.e., all three checks described in
the previous section fail, we increase the value of b by a
fixed increment bmc inc, and we continue until at least one
of the three checks succeeds. At the end, once we arrive at
a discriminating set of input sequences for our camouflaged
circuit, we employ the technique described in Section 3.3.3
to find a correct completion for our circuit.
Algorithm 1: Scan-Chain-Free Decamouflaging.
1 I← ∅, b← 0
2 while true do
3 b← b+ bmc incr
4
〈
X1, X2, I˜
〉
←MBMC(C, I, C(I), b)
5 if
〈
X1, X2, I˜
〉
6= true then I← I ∪ I˜
6 else if UC (C, I, C(I)) or CE(C, I, C(I)) or
MUMC (C, I, C(I)) then break
7 return N(C, I, C(I))
3.4 Implementation of Solvers
We now describe how the solvers referred to in the previ-
ous section are implemented using a model checker. Model
checkers take as input a model of an FSM represented as a
Kripke structure. We begin by describing an FSM model for
the camouflaged circuit C, and the Kripke structure that we
use as input for the model checker.
Corresponding to each completion X of circuit C is an
FSM (I,O,S, s0, σx, ωx) where:
• I = {0, 1}m is the input alphabet of the FSM, the set
of all possible inputs,
• O = {0, 1}n is the output alphabet of the FSM, the
set of all possible outputs,
• S = {0, 1}l is the set of states of the FSM, a set of all
l-bit Boolean vectors,
• s0 ∈ S, the initial state of the black-box circuit,
• σX is the state-transition function, σX : S × I → S,
• ωX is the output function, ω : S × I → O.
For an input sequence I = (i0, i1, . . .), we can write CX(I)
in terms of σX and ωX as follows:
CX(I) = (ωX(i0, s0), ωX(i1, σX(s0, i0)), . . .)
Our MUMC solver takes an instance 〈C, I, C(I)〉 of DISC-
SET-SEQ-DEC and transforms it into a model checking in-
stance as follows. Let X = {0, . . . , t − 1}k be the set of all
possible completions. We define a set of atomic propositions
AP to be a singleton, consisting of an atomic proposition
equiv, the semantics of which we clarify below. We build a
Kripke structure M over AP from the tuple 〈C, I, C(I)〉 that
is input to the DISC-SET-SEQ-DEC problem. The character-
istics of M are as follows:
• The set of initial states of M is S×X ×S×X ×I, i.e.,
any state inM is a 4-tuple of the form (s1, X1, s2, X2, i)
where s1 and s2 are l-bit vectors, X1 and X2 are com-
pletions, and i is a m-bit vector representing an input.
• The set of initial states of M is {(s0, X1, s0, X2, i) :
X1, X2 ∈ X , i ∈ I and CX1(I) = CX2(I) = C(I)}.
• M ’s transition relation, R is defined as follows: R =
((s1, X1, s2, X2, i), (s
′
1, X1, s
′
2, X2, i
′)) : s1, s2, s′1, s
′
2 ∈
S, X1, X2 ∈ X , i, i′ ∈ I such that σX1(i, s1) =
s′1 and σX2(i, s2) = s
′
2}. That is, the system can
transition from a state (s1, X1, s2, X2, i) to a state (s
′
1,
X1, s
′
2, X2, i
′) if and only if when CX1 and CX2 are in
states s1 and s2, respectively, and we apply input i to
both circuits, CX1 and CX1 transition to states s
′
1 and
s′2 respectively. The transition relation also requires
that X1 and X2 retain their initial values throughout
the evolution of the model.
• M ’s labeling function, L, is defined as follows: L(s1, X1,
s2, X2, i) = {equiv} if ωX1(s1, i) = ωX2(s2, i), other-
wise L(s1, X1, s2, X2, i) = ∅, i.e., the proposition equiv
is true in a state (s1, X1, s2, X2, i) if and only if when
CX1 and CX2 are in states s1 and s2, respectively, and
we apply input i to both circuits, CX1 and CX1 pro-
duce the same output.
We have the following proposition:
Proposition 3. For a given DISC-SET-SEQ-DEC instance
〈C, I, C(I)〉, if the structure M constructed as above satis-
fies the specification G equiv, that is, for every i ∈ I and
every X1, X2 ∈ X , M, (s0, X1, s0, X2, i) |= G equiv, then
〈C, I, C(I)〉 is a true instance of DISC-SET-SEQ-DEC, that
is, I is a discriminating set for C.
Proof (Sketch). We can interpret the structure M as
follows. M represents the reachable states of a system that
consists of two completed circuits CX1 and CX2 of C that
agree with the black-box circuit on every input sequence in
I. The two completions are simultaneously exercised at ev-
ery step with the same input. The equiv proposition holds
at any state if the two completions produce the same output
for the input applied in that state. If the equiv proposition
holds on every path of M , as expressed by the linear tempo-
ral logic formula G equiv, then we have that any two such
CX1 and CX2 are equivalent. Since a correct completion has
to necessarily agree with the black-box circuit on every in-
put sequence, it follows that both X1 and X2 are equivalent
to some correct completion, and are therefore, by exten-
sion, correct completions themselves. By the definition of a
discriminating set of input sequences, then, it follows that
〈C, I, C(I)〉 is a true instance of DISC-SET-SEQ-DEC.
The above structure can be described using NuSMV’s in-
put language, with size at worst polynomial in the given
DISC-SET-SEQ-DEC instance. The MUMC solver thus pro-
duces a description of the structure M corresponding to the
input DISC-SET-SEQ-DEC instance, and invokes a model
checker asking to verify the specification G equiv on M .
If the model checker says that M satisfies the specification,
MUMC returns true, otherwiseMUMC parses the counterex-
ample returned by the model checker for a tuple
〈
X1, X2, I˜
〉
to be returned to the caller, as expressed in Algorithm 1. We
implement the solvers MUC and MCE using similar calls to
a model checker on (slight variations of) the structure M .
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we describe our experimental results. We
begin by describing our experimental setup, and then ana-
lyze the strength of our attack empirically.
4.1 Experimental Setup
We implement our attack procedure using C++ in ≈ 700
lines of code, and use NuSMV [17] as the back-end model
checker. All experiments were executed on an Intel(R) Xeon
CPU E5-2650 processor. We assume a camouflaged standard
cell library that can implement either a NAND or a NOR
function. Note that the camouflaged standard cell library in
[6] also implements XOR functions (in addition to NAND
and NOR), but we did not observe any instances of XOR in
the benchmarks that we use.
Table 1: Benchmark characteristics.
B’mark #PIs #POs #FFs #Gates
s344 9 11 15 160
s349 9 11 15 161
s382 3 6 21 158
s400 3 6 21 162
s444 3 6 21 181
s526 3 6 21 193
s820 18 19 5 289
s832 18 19 5 287
s953 16 23 29 395
s1196 14 14 18 529
s5378 35 49 179 2779
s9234 19 22 228 5597
s38584 12 278 1452 19253
b04 11 8 66 628
b08 9 4 21 183
b14 32 54 245 5678
We implemented two techniques to select which gates to
camouflage: (1) the output corruptibility + non-resolvable
(OC/NR) technique proposed by [6], which is secure against
VLSI test based attacks, and (2) random selection, in which
the camouflaged gates are picked uniformly at random from
the set of eligible gates in the circuit.
We use circuits from the ISCAS’89 [13] and the ITC’99
[18] sequential benchmark suites. The characteristics of the
benchmarks in terms of the number of inputs, outputs, flip-
flops and gates is shown in Table 1. More details about
these benchmarks can be found in [13] and [18]. We note
that the b14 benchmark implements a subset of the VIPER
processor. For the s38584 benchmark, all our attack runs
crashed, presumably because the model checking instances
we generated in our procedure for s38584 were too large for
NuSMV to handle. As such, we do not report any further
results for this benchmark.
4.2 Experimental Results
Table 2 shows the results of our attack on the scheme in
which gates are randomly camouflaged. We created 10 dif-
ferent camouflaged circuits for every benchmark, each with a
different random selection of 32 camouflaged gates. The ta-
ble plots (1) the number of discriminating input sequences,
(2) the maximum length of an input sequence in the dis-
criminating set, (3) the time taken by our attack, and (4)
the number of attack runs (out of 10) that were successful
and, for successful attacks, the termination condition that
provided the correct completion.
Several observations are in order. Out of 160 attacks, 135
runs were successful. We were unable to decamouflage any
instance of the s9234 benchmark, only decamouflaged one
instance of the s5378 benchmark, and seven instances of the
s400 and s444 benchmarks. On the other hand, our attack
decamouflaged all instances of the b14 benchmark, one of
the largest that we tried.
We hypothesize that even though the s400 and s444 bench-
marks are small, they are hard to decamouflage because they
have a relatively small number of primary inputs and out-
puts (3 PIs and 6 POs) compared to the number of bits of
internal state (21 FFs each). We note that our attack re-
quired relatively long input sequences of length up to 90 for
the instances in which we successfully decamouflaged these
benchmarks. We do show that on all of the instances of
s400 and s444 for which we are unsuccessful, we are able to
correctly recover at least 30 of 32 camouflaged gates.
Another interesting observation is that our UC and CE
termination conditions that try to avoid calls to an un-
bounded model checker enhance success of our attack. For
example, on the one instance of c5378 that we decmaou-
flaged, we were able to terminate because our combina-
tional equivalence (CE) check succeeded quickly; a call to
unbounded model checker to decide whether to terminate
was still running after several hours.
Table 3 shows the same data, but this time for the OC/NR
based camouflaging approach [6] and are qualitatively sim-
ilar. Since the procedure is deterministic, we generate only
one camouflaged netlist for each benchmark. It is interesting
to note that OC/NR does not seem to provide any additional
security against the model checking attack compared to the
random camouflaging scheme.
Our empirical attack results provide mixed evidence as to
our central question: does blocking access to scan chains
increase the immunity of camouflaged sequential circuits
against reverse engineering attacks. On the one hand, us-
ing our proposed model checking attack, we were able to
decamouflage relatively large benchmark circuits. On the
other, benchmarks like s5378 and s9234 have been decam-
ouflaged in prior work [9] assuming scan access. Withhold-
ing scan access does seem to increase the security for these
benchmarks.
4.2.1 Partial Completions
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Figure 3: Histogram of number of partially decamouflaged
gates for the s5378 benchmark across nine runs on which our
attack did not successfully recover every camouflaged gate.
Table 2: Results of proposed attack on FSMs camouflaged
using random selection. Also noted are the termination con-
ditions: unique completion (UC), combinational equivalence
(CE) and unbounded model checker (UMC).
B’Mark # Disc Inputs Max Steps Time (s) Termination
min max min max min max UC/CE/UMC
s344 3 5 10 10 11 37 10/0/0
s349 3 7 10 10 15 69 10/0/0
s382 25 36 50 60 3482 41129 10/0/0
s400 18 34 50 90 4921 526499 6//0/1
s444 16 35 50 90 3379 52984 2/0/5
s510 7 15 30 40 300 29121 10/0/0
s526 29 39 120 120 37979 139252 10/0/0
s820 14 20 10 10 506 1030 10/0/0
s832 12 21 10 10 370 1211 10/0/0
s953 10 22 10 10 365 1709 10/0/0
s1196 14 44 10 10 795 2386 10/0/0
s5378 7 - 30 - 1350 - 0/1/0
s9234 - - - - - - 0/0/0
b04 4 9 10 10 31 151 10/0/0
b08 26 117 20 20 619 10527 10/0/0
b14 14 21 10 10 14308 34273 10/0/0
Table 3: Results of proposed attack on FSMs camouflaged
using the OC/NR technique from [6]. Also noted are the
termination conditions: unique completion (UC), combi-
national equivalence (CE) and unbounded model checker
(UMC).
B’Mark # Disc Inputs Max Steps Time (s) Termination
s344 4 10 14 UC
s349 3 10 8 UC
s382 34 60 17713 UMC
s400 26 60 14803 UMC
s444 36 80 150569 CE
s510 13 40 703 UC
s526 29 80 13001 UC
s820 23 10 1508 UC
s832 16 10 253 UC
s953 11 10 127 UC
s1196 17 10 1150 UC
s5378 - - - -
s9234 - - - -
b04 7 10 191 UC
b08 31 20 1734 UC
b14 13 40 19026 UC
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 32  64  128  256
Ti
m
e 
to
 d
ec
am
ou
fla
ge
 (m
in
s)
Number of camouflaged gates
(a) Attack time.
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 32  64  128  256
Si
ze
 o
f D
is
cr
im
in
at
in
g 
Se
t
Number of camouflaged gates
(b) Discriminating set size.
Figure 4: Effect of increasing number of camouflaged gates
on attack performance on the s1196 benchmark on (a) at-
tack run-time, and (b) size of the discriminating set of input
sequences.
We tried recovering the identities of as many camouflaged
gates as possible for benchmarks that we could not success-
fully decamouflage every gate. We do this using a technique
similar to the one proposed in [10], i.e., any camouflaged gate
that is assigned the same identity by all remaining comple-
tions (those not eliminated by the set I) can be assigned
that identity. We call this a partial completion.
Based on this technique, we found that we were able to
correctly identify 30 out of 32 camouflaged gates for the six
s400 and s444 benchmark instances that we could not fully
decamouflage. Figure 3 plots the histogram of the number
of correctly decamouflaged gates for the nine runs of the
s5378 benchmark on which we were unsuccesful. We ob-
serve that between 21 and 29 out of 32 gates are correctly
decamouflaged, significantly reducing the attacker’s search
space. For instance, in the two cases where our partial com-
pletion attack recovered 29 camouflaged gates, the attacker
has only 16 remaining possibilities.
4.2.2 Impact of Number of Camouflaged Gates
So far, we have assumed in our experiments that only 32
gates are camouflaged. We increased the number of camou-
flaged gates for the s1196 benchmark from 32 to 256 (includ-
ing 10 runs for each) and found that we are able to decam-
ouflage the circuit in each case. Figure 4 plots the run-time
of our attack and the number of input sequences required to
decamouflage (size of discriminating set) each instance. An
interesting observation is that although the number of in-
put sequences required to decamouflage the circuit increases
with increasing number of camouflaged gates, the length of
the input sequences in the discriminating set was always at
most 10.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed the first attack methodology
for reverse-engineering camouflaged sequential circuits with-
out assuming that the attacker has scan chain access. We
have identified the computational complexity of two under-
lying sub-problems on which our attack procedure relies, and
show that the problem of determining when a given set of
input sequences is sufficient to decamouflage a circuit is in
PSPACE. Based on this observation, we have developed a
practical and scalable attack procedure that makes iterative
calls to a bounded model checker.
Our attack is effective on the majority of the benchmarks
we tested, including a large sequential benchmark with more
than 5000 gates. However, there are benchmarks that the at-
tack does not fully decamouflage, suggesting that removing
scan access may indeed be helpful in increasing the resiliency
of some circuits against reverse engineering attacks. The
attack motivates the need for further research into camou-
flaging mechanisms for sequential circuits that leverage the
attacker’s lack of access to internal state to further enhance
resilience against our attack.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1
We prove that DISC-SET-SEQ-DEC is in PSPACE by de-
scribing an algorithm for solving DISC-SET-SEQ-DEC that
requires an amount of space that is at worse polynomial
in the size of the input instance. Recall that the input to
DISC-SET-SEQ-DEC is a tuple C, 〈C, I,O〉 where C is a cam-
ouflaged circuit, I is a set of input sequences, and O is a set
of output sequences corresponding to an input sequence in
I. A precondition on C, 〈I〉 is that there exists at least one
completion X of C such that CX(I) = O. The algorithm we
propose is as follows:
For every pair of completions X1 and X2 in X , we check
whether CX1(I) = O and CX2(I) = O. This can be done
using O(|C|) space, where the size of C is the number of
inputs of wires plus the number of gates in C. If any of X1
or X2 do not satisfy the condition, we move on to the next
pair; otherwise, we check whether CX1 and CX2 agree with
each other on every input sequence of length l. Again, this
can be done in O(l|C|) space. If we find an input sequence of
length l for which CX1 and CX2 produce different outputs,
we return false. If we exhaust every pair of completions in
X , we return true.
